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BANKING ABROAD- WHY AND How?

In the second half of the Twentieth Century, the investment of U.S.
companies abroad grew dramatically as the United States emerged as a
world economic power. The number of foreign offices of U.S. banks
skyrocketed commensurate with new U.S. investment, and new challenges
to the understanding and regulation of banking deposits abroad
accompanied this growth.'
In 1960, eight U.S. banks maintained offices abroad; in 1984, there were
163; and by 1987, 902 U.S. banks had offices abroad.2 In 1985, there were
over 2,000 foreign offices of American banks, with Citibank and Chase
Manhattan together accounting for nearly 1,200 offices at the end of 1983.3
At that time, more than half of the total assets of both banks were foreign.4
As of 2013, Citibank claims to operate over 4,000 branches overseas,
including offices in 160 countries across North and South America, Europe,
the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.6 According to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), foreign branch deposits have
doubled since 2001 alone, totaling approximately $1 trillion.7

1. See M. Ann Hannigan, United States Home Bank Liabilityfor Foreign Branch
Deposits, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 735, 737 (1989).
2.
Adam Telanoff, Comment, American Parent Bank Liability for Foreign
Branch Deposits: Which Party Bears Sovereign Risk?, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 561, 568
(1991).
3.
Ethan W. Johnson, Comment, Reducing Liability of American Banks for
ExpropriatedForeign Branch Deposits, 34 EMORY L.J. 201, 201 (1985).
4.
Id.
5.
Citibank Branches, CITIGROUP, https://online.citibank.com/U.S./JRS/pands/
detail.do?ID=FinancialCenters (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
6.
See Citi Mission & Principles, CITIGROUP, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/
about/mission-principles.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); see generally Citi Country
Presence, Citigroup, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/about/countrypresence/ (last visited

Apr. 9, 2014).
7.
FDIC Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11604, 11605 (proposed Feb. 19, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330).
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A U.S. bank may establish a foreign presence in a number of ways,
including through representative offices, shell branches, correspondent
banking relationships, affiliates, subsidiaries, or branches.8 The Federal
Reserve Act of 1913 grants banks the authority to open foreign branches,9
and the branch office is the most common form of foreign involvement.'o
Nationally chartered banks operate the majority of foreign branches." A
foreign branch is subject to both American law 2 and the laws and
regulations of the country in which it is located.13 Host country law may
apply to capital requirements, reserves, submission to local courts and laws,
and assurances from the parent bank.14
As with U.S. banks, foreign banks can accept two broad types of
deposits: special deposits and general deposits. In a special deposit, the
deposited funds are kept separate from the bank's funds, and the same bills
deposited must be returned.15 They are, however, less common than the
general deposit, in which the funds deposited become the property of the
bank and the depositor can demand payment for general assets of the
bank.16
The U.S. bank regulatory environment has generally been favorable for
foreign branches.' 7 For instance, Regulation D, which pertains to reserves
that depository institutions are required to maintain for "the purpose of
facilitating the implementation of monetary policy," does not apply to any
deposit that is payable only at an office located outside the United States. 8
The rule's impact is significant-U.S. banks do not have to hold reserves
against the large amount of deposits at foreign branches of their banks.
Further, the overwhelming majority of foreign deposits are not dually
payable; that is, they are not payable at the U.S. home office in addition to
being payable at the foreign branch.19 Significantly, recent events have
8.

See Telanoff, supra note 2, at 569; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 206.

9.

See 12 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).

10.
Telanoff, supra note 2, at 570.
11.
See Hannigan,supra note 1, at 758.
12. There are exemptions, as noted above.
13.
Francis D. Logan & Mark A. Kantor, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign
Branches of U.S. Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 333, 334 (1982).

14.

See id.

15. Johnson, supra note 3, at 209.
16. Id.
17.
Telanoff, supra note 2, at 569.
18. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c)(4)-(5) (2014). Furthermore, before its repeal,
Regulation Q's establishment of a ceiling for interest paid on deposits did not apply to
deposits payable only outside the United States. Telanoff, supra note 2, at 569 n.62.
19.
See FDIC Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit, 78
Fed. Reg. 11604, 11605 (proposed Feb. 19, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330).
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made it less costly for banks to hold dually payable deposits. 2 0 The DoddFrank Act, as one such event, altered the deposit insurance assessment such
that all liabilities are included, so dual-payability no longer increases the
assessment base. 2' Additionally, the Federal Reserve now pays interest on
reserves.22 Nonetheless, banks have been hesitant to make deposits in
foreign branches dually payable because they have concerns that dualpayability would mean they would no longer be protected from sovereign
risk under Section 25(c) of the Federal Reserve Act. 2 3
While domestic branches of U.S. banks are not considered separate legal
entities, foreign branches of U.S. banks have been treated by courts as
separate entities, and accordingly banks have traditionally not been
compelled to incorporate as a subsidiary abroad to shield the parent from
liability. 24 This is known as the "Separate Entity Doctrine," but courts
have not treated it as an ironclad principle, resulting in a great deal of
uncertainty regarding liability for foreign branch deposits.
Foreign branches provide many of the same kinds of services that a
domestic branch would provide to its customers, including investment of
funds brought in from outside the host country and the lending of local
funds received as deposits. 2 5 Foreign offices of U.S. banks may also
finance the importation of U.S. goods or the exportation of goods to the
U.S. 26 U.S. banks often operate these branches "to provide banking,
foreign currency, and payment services to multinational corporations." 27
Often, foreign branches of U.S. banks do not offer retail deposit or retail
banking services, but rather accept deposits from large businesses seeking
the convenience of the bank's international branch network.28
In general, foreign branch banking is beneficial to all parties involved, as
foreign countries obtain investment capital and U.S. financial services and
U.S. companies reap the profitable rewards of foreign operations. Further,
corporations may use foreign bank deposits as a means of minimizing U.S.
tax consequences. Problems can arise, however, when tumultuous social

20. Id.
21.
See id. (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24. See Hannigan, supra note 1, at 739.
25.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 205.
26. Id.
27. FDIC Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11605.
28. See id. (explaining how banks take advantage of transferring from branch to
branch in different countries based on deposit agreements not governed by U.S. law).
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and political events in countries where U.S. bank branches are located
result in questions as to whether risk of political upheaval ("political risk")
is borne by depositors or by the U.S. offices of the branch. Accordingly,
banks have attempted to "ringfence" foreign deposits; to wall them off so
that they are not payable in the U.S. The U.S. government and state
governments have sought, in various ways, to "ringfence" foreign deposits
as well, either by attempting to ensure that banks are not liable for the
deposits or by mandating that deposits payable outside the U.S. are not,
unlike deposits payable exclusively in the U.S., backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government. Part II of this Article will review the cases
that examine political risk and U.S. bank foreign branch deposits. Part III
will review various solutions offered to this problem in the last three
decades, including a rule issued by the FDIC in late 2013 aimed at
addressing aspects of this very issue. Part IV will offer some conclusions
regarding the allocation of political risk in foreign bank deposits.
II.

CASES AND CONFLICTS: THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM

The Russian Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, and the Vietnam War
posed complex issues related to foreign deposits in U.S. banks, and resulted
in case law that sought to develop an overarching theory of liability for
foreign bank deposits. In general, the cases surrounding these political
upheavals involve emerging regimes nationalizing the assets of private
banks without expressly declaring their intentions regarding the banks'
liabilities, leaving the banks with all of their obligations and none of their
assets.29 Upon analysis, the relevant cases do not reflect a clear and
consistent approach by courts, and developing more consistent outcomes is
indispensable to creating certainty for U.S. investors and those seeking
funding for ventures abroad.
A.

The Russian Revolution Cases

Boris N. Sokoloff was a Russian citizen residing in New York City
following the overthrow of the Imperial Government in Russia in March
1917 and preceding the Bolshevik Revolution later that year.3 0 In June of
that year, Sokoloff deposited $31,108.50 in the New York branch of
National City Bank to be transferred to the branch in Petrograd; in
September, he departed New York and arrived in Petrograd." Just prior to
the Bolshevik Revolution, Sokoloff instructed the Petrograd branch to

29. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 213.
30. See Sokoloff v. Nat'I City Bank of N.Y., 130 Misc. 66, 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1927), aff'd, 227 N.Y.S. 907 (App. Div. 1928), aff'd, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928).
31. Id. at 68-69.
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transfer the bulk of his account, now denominated in rubles, to a bank in
Kharkoff via the Russian State Bank.3 2 Upon discovering that the new
bank did not receive his funds, he instructed the Petrograd branch to cancel
the transfer and hold his funds, which the branch told him it could not do,
as it had already acted upon his transfer request.33 The Petrograd branch
inquired with the State Bank as to the status of the funds, and the State
Bank replied that it was unsure of the status because of a failure of
communication, presumably due to the revolution. 34 Ultimately, the State
Bank confirmed that no transfer had been made to Kharkoff, and the
Petrograd branch asked to be re-credited with the transfer amount.35
In December 1917, the Soviet Government issued a decree merging all
existing banks into the State Bank, and on the same day soldiers occupied
the Petrograd branch and took possession of it.36 The State Bank limited
the amount of rubles that the Petrograd branch could disperse in a given
day, 37 but during the spring of 1918 the branch sent two letters to
depositors encouraging them to withdraw any balance held at the branch.38
In December 1918, the bank was nationalized and all assets were
confiscated.3 9
Sokoloff sued the National City Bank branch in New York. In denial of
a motion for re-argument before the New York Court of Appeals in 1924,
Judge Cardozo noted the defendant's claim that the plaintiff "was fully
aware of the probability of future political and governmental changes," and
had therefore, in essence, assumed the risk of revolution. 4 0 Cardozo, and
the court, held that neither the bank's attempt to terminate its existence nor
the seizure of the bank's assets affected its" liability "because the Russian
government "could not terminate [the bank's] existence ... for it was a
corporation formed under [U.S.] laws."4 1 By simply "depriv[ing] it of the
privilege of doing business upon Russian soil," the Russian government did
not "end[] its duty to make restitution for benefits received without
32.
Id. at 69.
33.
See id. at 69-70 (having already debited Sokoloff the 120,000 rubles and
credited that amount to the record of its account with the State Bank, the Petrograd
branch claimed that it no longer possessed the funds Sokoloff now wished it to hold).
34.
See id. at 70.
35.
Id. (noting that the Petrograd branch chose not to inform Sokoloff of its receipt
of this news from the State Bank).
36.
Id. at 71.
37.
Americans were permitted to withdraw 500 rubles per day; all others were
permitted to withdraw 150 rubles per week. See id.

38.

See id.

39.
40.
41.

See id. at 72.
Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 145 N.E. 917, 918 (N.Y. 1924).
Id. at 919.
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requital .'2

Most importantly, Cardozo explicitly tied the Petrograd branch to the
assets of the home office in the U.S., asserting that Sokoloff "did not pay
his money to the defendant, and become the owner of this chose in action,
upon the security of the Russian assets," but rather "[h]e paid his money to
a corporation organized under our laws upon the security of all its assets,
here as well as elsewhere."43 Indeed, Cardozo held that "[e]verything in
Russia might have been destroyed by fire or flood, by war or revolution,
and still the defendant would have remained bound by its engagement.'A4
The Supreme Court of New York County, hearing the case again in
1927, held that a contract was entered into between Sokoloff and National
City, whereby the latter was to pay on demand in Petrograd.4 5 Because
payment could not be made elsewhere, the court asserted, there was an
"implied obligation on the part of the defendant that it would maintain its
branch in Petrograd.4 6 The branches were separate entities, the court
asserted, "as distinct from one another as any other bank."4 7 However, it
asserted:
[W]hen considered with relation to the parent bank, [branches] are not
independent agencies; they are, what their name imports, merely
branches, and are subject to the supervision and control of the parent
bank, and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank carries on its
business, and are established for its own particular purposes, and their
business conduct and policies are controlled by the parent bank, and their
property and assets belong to the parent bank, although nominally held in
the names of the particular branches .

.. .4

Ultimate liability for a debt of

a branch would rest upon the parent bank.48
The court emphasized that it was not "concerned with questions of
liability for transactions originating in Russia and wholly to be performed
in Russia, but with a debt incurred in this State which the defendant agreed
to pay on demand at its own branch in Petrograd.'A 9 The court also noted
that the bank's loss was somewhat of a fiction: after all, the transfer was

42.
43.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

44.

Id.

45. Sokoloff v. Nat'1 City Bank of N.Y., 130 Misc. 66, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1927),
affid, 227 N.Y.S. 907 (App. Div. 1928), affd, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928).
46. Id.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.

49.

Id. at 73-74.
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merely a "bookkeeping entry" that was not a loss until cash was paid.50
National City Bank's Petrograd branch "parted with nothing" and the
rubles it had promised through its bookkeeping entry "were [still] in its
possession." 5 "To constitute payment of a debt payable in money," the
court asserted, "there must be a delivery by the debtor or his representative
to the creditor or his representative of money or some other valuable thing
for the purpose of extinguishing the debt and which is received by the
creditor for the same purpose." 52
Addressing force majeure, the court asserted that the nationalization of
the Petrograd branch and seizure of its assets "have no force and effects as
acts of sovereignty," because the U.S. did not recognize the Soviet
Republic as a legitimate government of Russia.5 3 The confiscation by such
a government "has no other effect, in law, than seizure by bandits or by
other lawless bodies." 54
B.

The Vietnam War Cases: Fall ofSaigon

Six days before the fall of the South Vietnamese government in Saigon
in 1975, Chase Manhattan bank closed the doors of its Saigon branch
without any prior notice to depositors. 5 Staffers "balanced the day's
books, shut the vaults and the building itself, and delivered keys and
financial records needed to operate the branch to personnel at the French
Embassy in Saigon." 56 Shortly thereafter, the North Vietnamese
government issued a confiscation decree that applied to established banks,
and the French embassy turned over records from Chase to the new
government. 5 7 Two plaintiffs-one a shareholder in ten corporations with
deposits at Chase in Saigon and the other an individual depositor-fled
South Vietnam for the United States just prior to the communist takeover,
and upon arrival there, demanded payment from Chase on their Saigon
accounts.58 Chase refused to pay, and the depositors brought a breach of
contract claim in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.5 9

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
1981).
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court noted that "for purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is
not 'located' within a foreign state unless that state has the power to
enforce or collect it." 60 The court further elaborated that a state's
jurisdiction over the debtor determines whether the state has "the power to
enforce payment of a debt."6 1 Chase departed from Vietnam a week before
the North Vietnamese issued the confiscation decree, and, when Chase left,
the court held that the deposits no longer had their situs in Saigon. 6 2 Here,
the court endorsed the "springing situs" theory, which it credited to Patrick
Heininger:
The situs of a bank's debt on a deposit is considered to be at the branch
where the deposit is carried, but if the branch is closed, . .. the depositor
has a claim against the home office; thus, the situs of the debt represented
by the deposit would spring back and cling to the home office. If the situs

of the debt ceased to be within the territorial jurisdiction of (the
confiscating state) from the time the branch was closed, then at the time
the confiscatory decree was promulgated, (the confiscating state would)
no longer (have) sufficient jurisdiction over it to affect it.63
"[I]mpossibility of performance in Vietnam," the court went on to hold,
"did not relieve Chase of its obligation to perform elsewhere," because
operating abroad "through a branch instead of a separate corporate entity"
meant that Chase had "accepted the risk of liability in other jurisdictions for
obligations sustained by its branch." 64 The court cited Sokoloff for the
proposition that a branch's "utimate liability for a debt rests with the parent
bank." 65 A bank accepting deposits at a foreign branch is "a debtor, not a
bailee," the court held, before offering very specific instructions to banks
doing business abroad:
In the event that unsettled local conditions require it to cease operations,
it should inform its depositors of the date when its branch will close and
give them the opportunity to withdraw their deposits or, if conditions
prevent such steps, enable them to obtain payment at an alternative
location. In the rare event that such measures are either impossible or
only partially successful, fairness dictates that the parent bank be liable
60.
61.

Id. at 862.
Id. at 862.

62.

Id.

63. Id. at 862-63 (emphasis added); see also Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S.
Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 903,
975 (1979).
64. Id. at 863.
65. Id.
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for those deposits which it was unable to return abroad. To hold
otherwise would be to undermine the seriousness of its obligations to its
depositors and under some circumstances (not necessarily present here)
to gain a windfall. 66
Citibank's Saigon office suffered a similar fate when the South
Vietnamese government fell. In 1974, Quang Quy Trinh, a former South
Vietnamese government official, opened a joint bank account at Citibank's
Saigon office in his name and his son's name, paying an annual interest rate
of 19%.67 Per the deposit agreement, withdrawals were only permitted at
Citibank's Saigon branch and only in Vietnamese currency-piasters-and
the agreement further included a provision attempting to insulate the bank
from political risk: "Citibank does not accept responsibility for any loss or
damage suffered or incurred by any depositor resulting from government
orders, laws . .. or from any other cause beyond its control." 6 8
On April 24, 1975, in conjunction with the U.S. embassy's plan to
evacuate American citizens,69 Citibank closed its branch, leaving all branch
documents, files, records and books inside, and entrusting the cash, branch
keys, vault combination, and official documents to U.S. embassy officials.70
Trinh was sent to a reeducation camp, from which he did not emerge until
1980, at which time he inquired about his deposit with Citibank in New
York and was told that the National Bank of Vietnam was responsible for
it.

The United States District Court for the the Eastern District of Michigan,
in which Trinh filed suit for the deposit, found in his favor, relying heavily
on Vishipco and the "springing situs" theory.72 It also held that force
majeure was not implicated, because Citibank closed its branch voluntarily
and "not an act of God, act of government, or fortuitous cause beyond its
control."73 Additionally, the court held that Citibank failed to prove that the
confiscation included an assumption of the liabilities as well as the assets of
Citibank Saigon.74
On its review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

66.

Id. at 864.

67.
Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1166 (6th Cir. 1988).
68.
Id.
69. It is not coincidence, then, that this was the same date on which Chase
Manhattan vacated its Saigon office, as noted in the above discussion of Vishipco.
70.
See Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1166.
71.
Id. at 1175.

72.

See id.

73.
74.

Id. (quotations omitted).

Id.
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noted the Sokoloff court's assertion that the home office is liable on a
deposit placed at a branch if the branch closes or wrongfully returns it.7 5
Citibank's liability in this circumstance was consistent with the separate
entity doctrine, the court asserted, because closure of a branch is one of the
special circumstances triggering home office liability.7 6
The court also addressed the assumption of political risk, asserting that,
simply by the fact of the bank's operating a branch in Vietnam:
Citibank indicated to its foreign depositors that it accepted the risk that,
in at least some circumstances, it would be liable elsewhere for
obligations incurred by its branch. In so doing, it reassured those
depositors that their deposits would be safer with them than they would
be in a locally incorporated bank. With the volatile situation in Vietnam
in the early 1970's, this assurance of safety was undoubtedly one of the
primary factors motivating Vietnamese depositors, like Trinh, to place
their money in Citibank. Certainly, these depositors expected that
Citibank, with its worldwide assets and international reputation, would be
"good" for the deposits if, for whatever reason - whether it be financial
mismanagement, insolvency, or political events - Citibank Saigon could
not return them.77
In support of this proposition, the Trinh court cited to Vishipco's
assertion that "U.S. banks, by operating abroad through branches rather
than through subsidiaries, reassure foreign depositors that their deposits
will be safer with them than they would be in a locally incorporated
bank. "8
The Trinh court did not believe that Citibank had effectively dispelled
Trinh's expectation that its worldwide assets would back the Saigon
deposit. 79 The agreement absolved the branch office of political risk, but
not the home office.8 0 In order to effectively limit their exposure to such
liability in deposit agreements, the court asserted, "limitation provisions
must be explicit and must clearly and unmistakably inform depositors that

75. See id. at 1168 (pointing to the Sokoloff court's holding that the ultimate
liability for a debt incurred by a branch rests with a parent bank).
76. See id. at 1168-69 (citing Sokoloff and similar cases dealing with home office
liability when a bank closes a branch).
77. Id. at 1169 (citations omitted).
78. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
1981).
79. See Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1169 (pointing to the fact that Citibank's decision to
open a Saigon branch indicated to foreign depositors that Citibank was willing to
accept the risk of potential liabilities for debts incurred by its branch).
80. Id. at 1169-70.
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they have no right to proceed against the home office."8 1
C. The Cuban Revolution
Rosa Manas y Pineiro, the wife of a former cabinet minister in the prerevolutionary Cuban government lead by Fulgencio Batista, deposited
almost a quarter million dollars in a Cuban branch of Chase Manhattan
Bank in 1958.82 On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro assumed control of
Cuba, and the couple subsequently fled to the United States.83 The newly
formed Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property ordered Chase
to close the accounts of former government officials and their families,
including Manas' accounts, and to hand the cash over to the new Castro
government, which it did.
All of Chase's Cuban branches were
nationalized in September 1960.84 When Manas sought to draw the funds
in 1974 and was denied, she filed suit.85
The trial court noted favorably the plaintiffs citation to Sokoloff for the
proposition that the parent bank is ultimately liable for the obligations of
the branch.86 However, it asserted, the "liability does not alter the situs of
the debt," and when the branch's liability is extinguished, the parent is
relieved of liability as well. The court held that its ruling on the validity
of the confiscation would violate the Act of State Doctrine, "which
precludes the courts of [the U.S.] from adjudicating the legality of acts of
foreign governments."88
The first appellate court disagreed, asserting that the doctrine would only
apply if the obligation was payable solely in Cuba, and that the doctrine
had never been applied "to relieve an American bank of obligations owed
by its branches to depositors." 89 Citing Vishipco, the court held that the
nationalization of its branch office did not extinguish Chase's liability for
the deposit. 90
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the lower court
had misapplied the Act of State Doctrine and distinguishing the Vishipco

81.
82.

Id. at H170.
Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 6 (N.Y. 1984).

83.

Id. at 6.

84.

Id. at 7.

85.

Id.

86.
Id.; see Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 130 Misc. 66, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1927), affd, 227 N.Y.S. 907 (App. Div. 1928), affd, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928).
87.
Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 8.
88.
See id. at 8, 11.
Id.
89.
90. See id. (reaching this result regardless of the fact that the Cuban government,
through Banco Nacional de Cuba, assumed Chase's liabilities for its Cuban branches).
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line of cases on the grounds that the government had specifically
confiscated Manas' funds in advance of nationalization of the branches. 9 1
For purposes of the Act of State Doctrine, the court asserted, "a debt is
located within a foreign State when that State has the power to enforce or
collect it," and the power to enforce a debt, in turn, depends on the presence
of the debtor. 9 2 At the time of confiscation, Chase was present in Cuba and
the debt was payable at any Chase bank in the world.93 But the debt was
nonetheless only a single obligation to pay, and once Cuba exercised its
jurisdiction to collect and enforce that debt-through its confiscationChase's debt to Manas was satisfied.94 The confiscation was an Act of
State and, as such, was unreviewable by the Court of Appeals. 9 5
In Perez, unlike the above cases, the court found for the debtor-Bank and
against the creditor-depositor. Yet the court rather convincingly argued
that its holding is consistent with both Vishipco and Sokoloff because the
"springing situs" theory espoused in those cases did not apply to Manas'
deposit.96 In the earlier cases, the courts asserted that confiscation orders
directed at depositors had no effect because, where the bank's foreign
branches had ceased operations before the confiscation orders, the situs of
the debt was no longer in the foreign state-it had sprung back. 97 In
Manas' case, the debt was "extinguished before the bank was nationalized,
[so] there [was] no occasion to apply the rationale" of those earlier cases. 98
A provocative dissent in Perez argued that the most appropriate way for
judges to defer to the acts of foreign governments would be to ignore legal
fictions such as "situs" regarding debt, which is an intangible, and focus on
the actual bank assets seized. 99 The bank should not be permitted, the
dissent asserted, to shift its loss to the depositor by refusing to pay an
account.100 The dissent then addressed political risk, making a point to
emphasize the fact that Chase was not ignorant as to the identity of the
people from whom it was accepting deposits:
The essence of the relationship between the parties is that the bank agreed
91.

See id. (going on to explain that the Act of State Doctrine would only be

inapplicable if Manas' funds were not payable in Cuba at the time of confiscation).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id.

95.

See id.

96.

Id. at 10.

97.

See id.

98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at l -15.
100. Id. at 14-15.
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to safeguard the depositor's money. It did so in the midst of a revolution
by accepting deposits from a person whose husband was an official in the
government under attack. The bank specifically agreed that the
certificates would be redeemed at any of its branches, most of which are
in this country, and further agreed to pay in United States currency. Even
after the revolution had succeeded, the bank remained in Cuba and
maintained assets all of which could have been, and in fact ultimately
were, confiscated by the Cuban government. Under these circumstances
it could be said that the bank was fully aware of and accepted the risk of
confiscation of its assets, and should not be permitted to refuse to honor
its commitment to this depositor after her arrival in this country.10'
Interestingly, in a case decided the same year, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with some of the reasoning in the
dissent in Perez and held in favor of a depositor in a case with strikingly
similar facts.102 Juanita Gonzalez Garcia and her husband, Lorenzo Perez
Dominguez, made two deposits totaling half a million pesos in a Cuban
branch of Chase in 1958.103 Dominguez, who had served in the Cuban
Senate for the previous four years and, prior to that as a colonel in the
Cuban Army, expressed to bank officers at the time of deposit that he was
concerned about the safety of his money.10 4 The officers expressed to him
that depositing with Chase represented "insurance" and "security" for his
funds, and that the home office guaranteed his deposit, which was
redeemable at any Chase branch. 0 5 As in Perez, Dominguez's accounts
were frozen and then seized by the Ministry of Recovery of
Misappropriated Property, before Chase was later nationalized.' 06 After
failing to recover the funds from Chase, Garcia filed suit.' 0 7
The court did not focus on intangibles or legal fictions in its Act of State
Doctrine analysis. It asserted that the "monies paid over to the Cuban
government did not come from funds specifically earmarked to
Dominguez's and Garcia's 'account,"' "but rather "from Chase's general
funds in the branch bank."'0o The bank's debt to its depositors "was not
extinguished merely because it was forced to pay an equivalent sum of its
own money to a third party," the court said starkly, before comparing the
101.

Id.

102. See generally Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1984).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.

107. Id. at 647-48.
108.

Id. at 649.

2014

"RINGFENCING" U.S. BANK FOREIGNBRANCH DEPOSITS

263

confiscation rather bluntly to a bank robbery:
Chase would not argue that its debt was extinguished if an armed gunman
had entered its Vedado branch and demanded payment of a sum equal to
the amount of its debt to Dominguez and Garcia. Yet in effect, this is
what transpired. The Cuban government did nothing more than "enter"
Chase's Vedado branch armed with [the confiscation law] and demand
depositors' money. Chase turned over funds without requiring the
surrender of the CDs, without notice to the holder of the CDs and without
a fight. As in the case of a bank robbery, the bank itself must bear the
consequences. 109
The court took pains to play up the depositors' emphasis on the safety of
their funds, and if there is any way to distinguish Garcia from Perez,
perhaps that is it. "The purpose of the agreement between Chase and
Dominguez and Garcia," the court held, "was to ensure that, no matter what
happened in Cuba, including seizure of the debt, Chase would still have a
contractual obligation to pay the depositors upon presentation of their
CDs.""10 Chase's international reputation was integral in the couple's
decision to deposit there, the court asserted, and the deposits would not
have been made absent such security.
The Act of State Doctrine, the court held, is not implicated in such a
case.11 2 The court's decision did not challenge the validity of a foreign
government's actions and had "no international repercussions."" 3 The
decision was "simply resolving a private dispute between an American
bank and one of its depositors."ll 4
D.

The Philippines Cases

In 1983, Wells Fargo Asia Limited ("WFAL") paid $2 million to
Citibank's New York office with the understanding that the money would
be deposited in Citibank's branch in Manila.11 5 Two months before the
deposits matured, the Philippine government issued an order asserting that
"[a]ny remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all
foreign obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions,
109. Id.
110. Id.at 650.
111. See id. (explaining that Chase failed to notify the couple that it would not
accept the risk of liability for obligations of its Cuban branch).
112. Id.at651.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1991).
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irrespective of maturity, shall be submitted to the Central Bank [of the
Philippines] thru the Management of External Debt and Investment
Accounts Department (MEDIAD) for prior approval" ("the Order").1 16 The
Central Bank of the Philippines interpreted this as preventing Citibank's
Manila branch from repaying the WFAL deposits with Philippine assets." 7
WFAL sued, and the Central Bank of the Philippines gave Citibank
permission to repay foreign depositors with non-Philippine assets, after
which Citibank repaid just under half of the $2 million deposit." 8
The Southern District of New York held for WFAL, rejecting Citibank's
impossibility defense and noting that the Order allowed repayment where
permission was obtained and that Citibank had not made a good faith effort
to obtain it.'1 9 Under New York Law, the court held that "Citibank's
worldwide assets were available" to satisfy WFAL.120
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
noting that a debt may be collected wherever repayable unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.121 Because there was no such restriction in this
case, WFAL was entitled to collect in New York.12 2 Reviewing that
decision, the United States Supreme Court asserted that the question was
whether, absent an agreement respecting collection from Citibank's New
York assets, WFAL could collect based on "rights and duties implied by
law." 23 It vacated and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to clarify
whether New York or Philippine law applied and to determine the outcome
accordingly.124
The Second Circuit quoted at length from the district court's analysis of
choice of law issues:
Jurisdiction in this action is asserted both on the basis of diversity and
federal question involving 12 U.S.C. § 632. In diversity cases, of course,
116. Id. at 724-5.
117. See id. (interpreting the Order as preventing Citibank/Manilla from repaying
WFAL with assets other than those deposited in banks elsewhere or invested in nonPhilippine enterprises).

118. Id.at725.
119. Id.
120. Id. (finding no evidence on the record of a separate agreement between the
parties restricting where the deposits could be collected, the court held that WFAL was
entitled to collect the deposits out of Citibank's New York assets).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see generally Citibank v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990).
124. See Wells Fargo Asia, 936 F.2d at 725; see also Citibank, 495 U.S. at 668,
673-74 (ordering further that the Second Circuit also consider whether federal common
law might apply).
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we must apply the conflict of law doctrine of the forum state .... In
federal question cases, we are directed to apply a federal common law
choice of law rule to determine which jurisdiction's substantive law
should apply ... . The rule in New York is that "the law of the
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied
and that the facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State
interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in
conflict.". . . Federal law invokes similar considerations ... and the
place of performance is considered an important factor.125
Under either test, the district court held, New York law should be used to
evaluate the claim.' 26 Because the transaction was in U.S. dollars, settled
through New York offices, and Citibank is headquartered in New York,
both parties would be justified in an expectation that New York law
applied.127 The goal of promoting certainty in financial markets is
achieved by applying New York law uniformly.' 28 The "most recent
pronouncement" from the New York Court of Appeals was, at that time,
Perez, which the district court cited for the proposition that "the parent
bank is ultimately liable for the obligations of the foreign branch." 29
The district court acknowledged that it was "aware of no persuasive
authority to tell us to what extent, if any, a New York court would defer to
local law in the situation here presented, where the foreign sovereign did
not extinguish the branch's debt either in whole or in part but merely
conditioned repayment on the obtaining of approval from a government
agency." 30 However, it asserted that this question need not be answered,
as Citibank had not "satisfied its good faith obligation to seek the
[Philippine] government's consent to use the assets booked at Citibank's
non-Philippine office."'31
The Second Circuit agreed, holding that Citibank was not excused from
payment despite its reliance on federal regulations asserting that a
"customer who makes a deposit that is payable solely at a foreign branch of
the depository institution assumes whatever risk may exist that the foreign
country in which a branch is located might impose restrictions on

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 726.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

130. Id. at 727.
131. See id. (citing Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450,
1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated, 495 U.S. 660

(1990)).
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withdrawals."' 32 The court noted that federal law "defines a deposit that is
'payable only at an office outside the United States' as 'a deposit . .. as to
which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the institution, to
demand payment only outside the United States."'l 3 3 Accordingly, there is
no "policy allocating the risk to depositors as a matter of law where there is
no such agreement." 34
The Second Circuit concluded that, "unless the parties agree to the
contrary, a creditor may collect a debt at a place where the parties have
agreed that it is repayable," and, in the "absence of any agreement
forbidding the collection in New York," it may be collected there.' 35
III. GOVERNMENTS REACT: RINGFENCING LAWS AND RULES

Various federal and state laws will have an impact on an analysis of the
appropriate political risk calculation regarding foreign bank deposits.
Typically, these laws and rules are a reaction to issues presented to
legislators and regulators by the U.S. banking industry. A new rule
finalized by the FDIC in late 2013, in reaction to a proposal by a foreign
bank regulator, would make clear that deposits in foreign branches of U.S.
banks are not FDIC insured but may be deposits for the purposes of socalled depositor preference regimes. All constitute attempts to ringfence
foreign deposits.
A. FederalBanking Laws
Federal law contains a sweeping provision regarding payment on
deposits in cases of emergency closure. 12 U.S.C. § 633 asserts that
Federal Reserve member banks are not liable for deposits made at a foreign
branch of a bank if they are unable to repay them as a result of either "an
act of war, insurrection, or civil strife" or "an action by a foreign
government or instrumentality (whether de jure or de facto) in the country
in which the branch is located." 36 An exception is made if "the member
bank has expressly agreed in writing to repay the deposit under those
circumstances," leaving banks the option of explicitly insuring customer
accounts against political risk, but taking from the courts the power to
impose an insurance requirement upon them.' 3 7
The federal statute did not exist prior to its adoption as part of the Riegle

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.128(c) (1990)).
Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t)).
Id.
Id. at 727-28.
12 U.S.C. § 633 (2012).
Id.
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Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994.1'3
After Vishipco, the banking community sought an addition to 12 U.S.C. §
1828 that would have added a subsection (in) to read as follows:
(in) In any action or proceeding brought in a state or Federal court in the

United States or the District of Columbia, the terms and conditions
adopted or made applicable by the parties to any deposit or other
obligation of a foreign branch of an insured bank shall be conclusive to
establish the place, currency and manner of performance of such deposit
or other obligations and the law or custom governing such performance.
Notwithstanding any other rules of law, where action or threats on the
part of any authority at the place where a foreign branch of an insured
bank is located prevents performance at the foreign branch of a deposit or
other obligations, in accordance with its terms and conditions establishing
the place, currency, and manner of such performance because of:
(i) seizure, destruction, cancellation, or confiscation by
governmental authorities of the branch's assets or business, or
assumption of its liabilities;
(ii) other similar governmental decrees or actions, or
(iii) closure of the branch in order to prevent, in the reasonable
judgment of the insured bank, harm to the bank's employees or
property
the deposit or other obligation of the foreign branch will not transfer
to and may not be enforce against any other office of the insured
bank located outside the country in which the foreign branch is
located.' 39
The proposed subsection was never introduced in Congress, despite some
evidence that regulators at the staff level favored it. 1 40
B.

State Banking Laws

Several states have passed legislation aimed at protecting the interests of
domestic banks abroad. These might be quickly dismissed as giveaways to
banking interests that are seeking to protect themselves from double
liability arising as a result of political risk. There is some evidence,
however, that these laws were drafted, in part, to protect local banks'
capital from flowing out of the state to the aid of non-residents injured by

138. See generally Riegle Community and Regulatory Development Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
139. See Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,Multinational
Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 795 n.258 (1989) (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828).
140. Id.
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actions undertaken by their very own governments.141
For example, New York banking law asserts that banks - including
national banks - located in New York and operating a branch abroad "shall
be liable for contracts to be performed at such branch office or offices and
for deposits to be repaid at such branch office or offices to no greater extent
than a bank . .. organized and existing under the laws" of the host

country.14 2 It also holds that if an authority that is not the de jure
government of a foreign territory seizes assets of a bank operating in that
territory, the liability of that bank "for any deposit theretofore received and
thereafter to be repaid by it... shall be reduced pro tanto by the proportion"
the seized assets bear to the bank's total deposit liabilities.14 3 Finally, it
asserts that a bank located in New York:
shall not be required to repay any deposit made at a foreign branch of any
such bank if the branch cannot repay the deposit due to (i) an act of war,
insurrection, or civil strife; or (ii) an action by a foreign government or
instrumentality, whether de jure or de facto, in the country in which the
branch is located preventing such repayment, unless such bank has
expressly agreed in writing to repay the deposit under such
circumstances. 144
New York's law did not cover national banks until the 1984
amendments; prior to that, it applied only to banks with state charters,
which greatly limited its usefulness, as most banks operating abroad are
nationally chartered.14 5
A portion of Nevada's banking law is dedicated to the emergency
closure of banks. It defines "emergency" as "any condition or occurrence
which may interfere physically with the conduct of normal business
operations at one or more or all of the offices of a bank, or which poses an
imminent or existing threat to the safety or security of persons or
property." 4 6 According to the law, any day on which an office of a bank is
closed for all or part of the day is treated as a bank holiday, and "[n]o
liability or loss of rights of any kind on the part of any bank, or director,
officer or employee thereof, shall accrue or result by virtue of any" such

141. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 234.
142. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138 (McKinney 2013).
143. Id.
144. Id. Michigan has a similar statute. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
(West 2013).
145. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 139, at 795-96.
146. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.265 (West 2013).

§ 487.13714

2014

"RINGFENCING" U.S. BANK FOREIGNBRANCH DEPOSITS

269

closing."1 4 7
C. FDICForeignDeposit Rules
One thing is certain, the FDIC, in its primary role as the U.S. deposit
insurer, wants to make very clear that it is not responsible for the U.S.
banks' foreign branch deposits. Earlier this year, the FDIC issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking in which it proposed a new regulation to explicitly
state that deposits payable in branches of U.S. insured depository
institutions outside the U.S. are not FDIC insured. 148 This would apply to
deposits even if they were considered dually payable, or payable in both the
U.S. and the foreign country.149 Under the rule, foreign deposits would still
be considered deposit liabilities even though they are not insured, and
would be on equal footing with domestic deposits under the depositor
preference regime of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.150 Accordingly,
these deposits would receive preferred status over general creditors in the
event of a bank failure and FDIC receivership.' 5 1
The rule is not intended to stop U.S. banks from drafting deposit
agreements in such a way as to protect themselves from sovereign risk
liability.'5 2 Rather, it is designed to ensure that the FDIC does not take on
the role of a worldwide insurer of deposits. 5 3
The notice of proposed rulemaking comes in response to a Consultation
paper issued by the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority ("UK
FSA"). This proposed to prohibit banks that are not based in the European
Economic Area ("EEA") from operating deposit-taking branches in the UK
unless UK depositors are put on an equal footing in the depositor
preference regime with depositors from the bank's home country in the
event of a resolution.' 54 The UK FSA offered several options for the nonEEA banks that wish to continue deposit-taking: (1) use a UKincorporated subsidiary instead of a branch, so that UK resolution and
insolvency laws apply and UK depositors are not subordinated to homecountry depositors; (2) segregate assets in the UK through a trust

147. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.305.
148. See FDIC Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit, 78
Fed. Reg. 1604, 11604 (proposed Feb. 19, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330).
149. Id.at 11604.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Indeed, the proposal makes clear that it is "not intended to preclude a United
States bank from protecting itself against sovereign risk by excluding from its deposit
agreements with foreign branch depositors liability for sovereign risk." Id. at 11605.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11605-06.
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arrangement and provide a legal opinion explaining how the arrangement
prevents subordination of UK depositors; (3) make the deposits dually
payable, such that under U.S. law, UK deposits would occupy the same
priority as uninsured home country deposits.'ss
The FDIC, predicting that most U.S. banks will prefer the third option
offered by the UK FSA, sought through this rulemaking to protect the
Deposit Insurance Fund ("DIF") by clarifying that a foreign branch deposit,
though it may be dually payable and on the same footing as a domestic
deposit in terms of the depositor preference regime, is not insured by the
DIF.'5 ' The FDIC believed that this rule will preserve confidence in the
DIF by protecting it against the possibility of becoming a global deposit
insurer. 157
On September 13, 2013, the FDIC adopted a final rule to clarify that
deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks are not FDIC insured though they
may be deposits for purposes of the depositor preference regime.158 The
comment period ended on April 22, 2013, and the FDIC received comments
from only three industry groups and two individuals.' 59 Commenters
generally did not object to the concept that the DIF should not insure deposits
in foreign branches, but suggested an alternative approach whereby the FDIC
interpret "deposit liability" to include all deposits of a U.S. bank no matter
where payable for the purposes of the depositor preference regime in Section
11(d)(11) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.' 6 0 Such an approach,
commenters argued, would "bolster[] international cooperation" and
"eliminate[] the potential for inconsistent treatment of deposits in different
foreign jurisdictions," in addition to saving the FDIC the expense of
continued efforts at guidance to banks, foreign depositors, and foreign
regulators regarding dual payability.' 6 1 The FDIC rejected this approach as
"inconsistent with current statutory language," and did so explicitly
"[w]ithout expressing an opinion as to the merits" of the policy arguments
commenters made in support of their approach.162 Accordingly, the rule was
ultimately adopted as proposed, with minor changes that did not impact the
substance of the proposal.163

155. Id. at 11606.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 11604.
158. FDIC Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit, 78 Fed.
Reg. 56583, 56583 (Sept. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330).
159. Id. at 56585.
160. Id. at 56585-86.
161. Id. at 56586.
162. Id. at 56586-87.
163. Id. at 56587-89.
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IV. SOLUTIONS FOR BANKS
There have been various proposed solutions to the uncertainty faced by
banks attempting to protect themselves against the political risk of
operating branching abroad. Organizational practicesl 64 have not been
successful in containing branch liabilities.' 65 Several other proposed
solutions are examined below.
A.

"PartialSuspension of Operations" Theory

One author has suggested that the Federal Reserve Board adopt a
regulation permitting U.S. banks to "partially suspend the operations of a
foreign branch during periods of unrest in the host country."' 66 This
proposal was primarily a response to Vishipco, in which the closure of the
branch resulted in the debts "springing back" to the home office, where
courts held they were payable. As long as the branch stayed open, the debt
would presumably remain at the branch office and the home office would
not be liable. 167 If the political situation were to become untenable and
result in expropriation, the author argued, the home office would not be
liable because the debtor branch remained within the jurisdiction of the
expropriating power.' 6 8 Given the court's sweeping ruling in Garcia,it is
not clear that such a regulation would protect banks from liability following
expropriation. After all, if courts have made a policy decision that banks
are offering political risk insurance to foreign branch deposits and the legal
decision that Act of State Doctrine does not apply to adjudications of
contract disputes between private parties, keeping the branch partially open
will not save the bank.
To prevent the banks from obtaining a windfall if it is "relieved of
liability yet permitted to retain assets that branch officials somehow
removed from the host country" or if it is insured against expropriation, this
author suggested that courts "require the home office to pass on to the
foreign branch depositors the value of any branch assets that the home
office recovers or any insurance payments received." 69 How this would
work in practice is unclear; if courts follow Vishipco to the letter and
determine that the home office is not liable for expropriated deposits under
a partial suspension scenario, how would they have the authority to force

164. For example, banks creating subsidiaries rather than branches.
165. Johnson, supra note 3, at 212.
166. Francis X. Curci, Foreign Branches of United State Banks-A Proposalfor
PartialSuspension During Periodsof Unrest, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 118, 131 (1983).
167. Id. at 134.
168. Id. at 135.
169. Id.
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an accounting of bank losses and ensure that the depositors share them
equally?
However, while courts would be ill suited to such an accounting, it is not
entirely out of the realm of possibility that the FDIC would be able to
undertake one. After all, the FDIC has the capabilities associated with
taking banks into receivership and accounting for their assets and liabilities.
Perhaps the appropriate regulation for the federal government to undertake
is one that allows the FDIC or the Federal Reserve to demand an
accounting from U.S. banks of the exact losses incurred as a result of
nationalization or expropriation.
In some cases, the funds lost will simply be bookkeeping entries that
never existed as cash reserves in the bank or were quickly moved to other
foreign branches or to the U.S. upon deposit. In some cases, the bank will
have made loans to locals that it is no longer able to enforce and collect
upon and will need to write off its books. There will be hard assets lost,
including real estate holdings, the bank office itself, certain repossessed
collateral, and whatever cash reserves the bank held in the host country.
But while the cases reviewed do not provide a dollar amount representing
what the affected branch had actually lost, that amount should not be a
mystery. Once this information is available, the FDIC or Federal Reserveor whatever body is placed in charge of winding down expropriated foreign
banks-could allocate the losses according to any number of algorithms.
One could envision a scenario in which the regulator would simply divide
them equally between the debtor-bank and creditor-depositors. Or perhaps
each depositor's funds would be reduced pro rata according to the amount
of its assets the bank lost, as envisioned by the New York statute.o In that
case, for example, a deposit of 50,000 bolivars at a Citibank branch in
Venezuela that demonstrated losses amounting to 20% of its assets would
be reduced commensurately by 10,000 bolivars.
V.

CONTRACT LANGUAGE

As discussed below, it is possible that risk can be appropriately
distributed between banks and their depositors via the language in deposit
agreements. There are legitimate questions to be raised, however, about
the fairness of this approach given (1) the disparity in bargaining power
between some depositors and the depository institutions; and (2) the
expectations of depositors - particularly less sophisticated depositors - that
their deposits are protected notwithstanding language in an agreement they
have
read.
may
not
may
or

170.

See supra,notes 141-42.
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A. Achieving Clearer UnderstandingsofRisk through ContractLanguage
Whether banks can limit their liability and depositors can clarify their
risk through the language of deposit agreements is an open question. Some
courts have been unwilling to side against plaintiffs even where it means
ignoring the language of the deposit agreement.
Banks may use deposit agreements to create various covenants and
clauses spelling out which countries laws would govern disputes, a forum
for litigation or restricting payment on the deposit to the issuing branch.17'
Courts have upheld such clauses in insurance policies and shipping
contracts, and might be willing to do the same in deposit agreements
assuming the bank could show that the limitation in the depositor's rights
had been freely bargained for.1 7 2
One author has argued that the explicit terms of the agreement and the
reasonable expectations of the parties ought to be the "fundamental issue"
in determining whether a bank is required to pay on a deposit that is
exposed to political risk.'7 3 She asserted that the Trinh court "rewrote the
deposit agreement and awarded the plaintiffs something they never had
under its terms - a deposit payable in the United States in the event of
expropriation."' 74 In Vishipco, too, it has been argued, the courts went out
of their way to produce a recovery of some kind for the plaintiff. 75
B.

The FairnessIssue in DistributionofPoliticalRisk through Contract

Perhaps the ultimate issue to resolve is the fairness of the ultimate
distribution of political risk. Where contract language is used to determine
that allocation, the parties with the greatest bargaining power will be
allocated less risk and those with lesser bargaining power will be allocated
more. That could mean that large, multinational corporations holding their
money abroad are able to demand payment of their accounts at a bank's
home office while the individual depositor is not. Perhaps this is as it
should be; after all, large corporate investors are providing the bank with
substantially more investment capital and, with that larger investment, they
receive greater benefits. On the other hand, individual depositors at a
commercial bank-when taken together-make up a sizable portion of
total deposits, and should not be left unprotected merely because they
cannot bargain collectively over deposit agreement language.
There is some disagreement about the appropriate distribution of political
171. Johnson, supra note 3, at 210.
172. Id.
173.
174.
175.

Hannigan, supra note 1, at 753.
Id. at 754.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 232.
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risk. In an article published several years before Trinh, for example, the
authors asserted, "the parties to a deposit contract logically would expect
the holder of an account at an overseas branch to accept the local legal and
political risks which may affect the deposit in the location of the branch." 7 6
A U.S. bank operating overseas does not intend, they assert, "to offer the
customers of that branch any greater or different protection against local
legal, regulatory, or political risks than that afforded by a locally
incorporated bank." 7 7 The authors cite to the Citibank's Amicus Curiae
brief in Vishipco for the proposition that banks operating international
branches have never understood their operations to provide political risk
insurance to their customers.' 78 They explain that the risk to the banks is
two-fold: (1) there is the risk that the brick and mortar premises, cash-onhand, deposits with other banks, investments, and right to repayment of
loans will be confiscated without adequate compensation; and (2) there is a
double-liability risk when "the host country expropriates a depositor's right
to repayment of a deposit" while the depositor demands payment

elsewhere.17 9
Another author, by contrast, agrees with the courts' thinking in Vishipco
and Trinh, asserting that a foreign national would have no reason to bank
with a local branch of an U.S. bank were it not for political risk
protection.' 80 But he goes even further, asserting that U.S. banks should be
happy to take this tradeoff: "foreign branch banks like those of Bank of
America may make more money providing de facto insurance against
revolution than they ever will lose in double payments following
expropriations."'8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It may seem as if this is a problem of the past; that the end of the spread
of communism means that expropriation of bank assets is a worry relegated
to the second half of the Twentieth Century. However, there is no reason to
believe that asset seizure by a foreign country will not happen in the future.
In resolving this complex problem, certainty on a going-forward basis is
paramount. The current state of disarray is bad for investors seeking
returns abroad and for those seeking U.S. funding for overseas ventures.
Accordingly, the time to prepare a coherent theory of bank liability is not

176. Logan & Kantor, supra note 13, at 336.
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after assets are seized, but right now.
Perhaps the best practical advice for banks regarding foreign deposits
comes down to the analysis of an author mentioned above,1 82 who points
out that maintaining foreign deposits and investment is, at the end of the
day, a profitable endeavor. Even if it means insuring a few unstable
countries against political risks, banks will ultimately profit. It is almost
certainly the case that a system in which banks guarantee foreign deposits
at the home office would result in additional foreign deposits, driving up
investment and profits. In exchange for that, banks would have to agree to
be on the hook for the few cases in which funds are expropriated or frozen.
In light of the FDIC's recent notice of proposed rulemaking regarding
foreign deposits and 12 U.S.C. § 633(a), banks should carefully and
narrowly draft deposit agreements with depositors in foreign branches, such
that there can be no confusion as to whether the home branch is liable for
foreign deposits. This includes not only explicit instructions as to where
deposits are payable, but perhaps also explicit instructions, in light of the
Wells Fargo case, as to where deposits are not payable. In the past, as the
cases summarized in Part II make clear, courts have not been inclined
towards sympathy with banks that have accepted deposits without the most
rigorous and express provisions regarding allocation of risk.
By the same token, depositors should keep in mind that, in spite of bankfriendly regulations, laws, and proposals to limit bank liability absent a
deposit agreement to the contrary, there is still the possibility of allocating
political risk to the bank by demanding that such allocation be included in
the deposit agreement. This caveat may not be helpful to small individual
depositors, but, as noted above, most depositors in foreign branches of U.S.
banks are, in fact, corporations, and such large organizations should have
the bargaining power to insist on certain terms in agreements in which they
provide foreign branches the capital to invest in places where investment
capital often sees far higher returns.

182. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.

